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Introduction 
Before the housing crisis, toxic subprime loans were deeply embedded in the mortgage market in 
the Twin Cities and were highly targeted towards communities of color. These loans contributed 
eventually to the foreclosure crisis and the staggering drops in housing values that 
disproportionately affected people of color, stripping many moderate- and low-income 
communities of enormous amounts of housing wealth. While subprime lending is much less 
common today, lack of access to credit continues to plague communities of color.  Income 
differences alone do not explain past and current lending disparities.  In 2004-06 subprime loans 
were the major problem – very high income black and Hispanic applicants were much more 
likely to get subprime loans than very low income white applicants.  More recently, the subprime 
market has largely disappeared but it is still true that very high income black loan applicants are 
more likely to be denied a loan than low income whites. In addition, racially diverse and majority 
non-white neighborhoods are dramatically still underserved in the mortgage market. 
Lenders could do much to open up the mortgage market for communities of color.  They could 
ensure that loan origination rates are similar for households with similar economic profiles 
(regardless of race).  They could also eliminate practices that currently lead to lower lending 
rates in diverse and majority-minority neighborhoods than would be expected given household 
incomes in those areas.  For instance, if the home purchase and refinance loan portfolios of the 
region’s banks simply reflected the regional distribution of homeowners and the actual mix of 
household incomes in each neighborhood, more than 13,300 additional loans would have been 
made in diverse and majority non-white neighborhoods over the four years from 2009 to 2012 (a 
55% increase).  Nearly one-fourth of this shortfall is attributable to the region’s largest lender – 
Wells Fargo Bank. 
 
Communities of color, subprime lending and loss of wealth 
Communities of color have been hardest hit by the mortgage meltdown.  Before the housing 
crisis, subprime lenders targeted people of color, racially diverse neighborhoods and majority 
non-white areas.  Between 2004 and 2006, exactly half of the mortgage loans received by black 
homeowners were subprime, compared to 37% for Hispanics, 20% for Asians and just 10% for 
whites.1 
Though blacks and Hispanics typically have lower incomes than white borrowers, income 
differences do not explain the disparities – very high income blacks and Hispanics were more 
likely to receive subprime loans than very low income whites.  In fact, very high income blacks 
were 3.8 times more likely to receive subprime loans for home purchases than very low income 
whites, and 1.9 times more likely to receive subprime refinance loans.2 Although income is not  
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the sole determinant of whether applicants obtain loans, it is hard to believe that credit profiles or 
economic factors other than income could justify differences of this magnitude between very 
high income black applicants and very low income white applicants. 
During the same period, subprime lending in the region was most concentrated in majority non-
white and racially diverse census tracts (more than 30% people of color) in the inner cities and in 
a few inner ring suburbs.  The two maps above show how closely the distribution of subprime 
loans matched the distribution of people of color.  Majority non-white and racially diverse tracts 
had subprime lending rates are 1.8 to 2.6 times greater than predominately white tracts (more 
than 70% white).  In these areas, both borrowers that are white and people of color have been 
affected, regardless of their income.  Even high and very high income whites were 1.8 to 2.9 
times more likely to receive a subprime loan in majority non-white areas than their counterparts 
in predominately white areas.3 
A place with the most egregious subprime lending rates in the Twin Cities area is the Near North 
area of Minneapolis.4  Over half of loans made in the neighborhood were subprime, nearly three 
times the subprime rate of the metro overall—with approximately two-thirds of subprime loans 
going to minorities. (See table next page.)  In Near North 58.7% of minority borrowers received 
a subprime loan, compared to 42% of whites.  While minorities were more likely to receive 
subprime loans than whites in the area, both minorities and whites were more likely to receive 
subprime loans in Near North than elsewhere in the region.  Even high to very high income 
whites had a subprime rate of 42.5 percent in Near North—4.6 times the rate of high to very high 
income whites overall in the metro.   
The other Minneapolis Northside neighborhood, Camden, had the second highest subprime 
lending rate of the neighborhoods—and similar disproportionate rates of subprime lending when 
considering the race and income of the borrowers.  It is worth noting that Camden is also 
adjacent to suburban areas northwest of Minneapolis—areas that also show very high subprime 
lending rates.  Both Northside neighborhoods had much higher rates of subprime lending than 
the suburbs overall and compared to more affluent city neighborhoods, such as Minneapolis’ 
Calhoun-Isle and Southwest and St. Paul’s Highland-South Mac Grove. 
The lack of prime lending branch locations in racially diverse and majority non-white 
communities contributes greatly to the uneven distribution of subprime loans.  According to the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition, the Twin Cities ranked last of the largest 25 U.S. 
metro areas for per capita bank branches in majority non-white census tracts.5  The number of 
banks in in majority non-white and racially diverse neighborhoods in the Twin Cities is only half 
what you would expect given their populations.  In contrast, majority non-white neighborhoods 
in the region have twice as many payday lenders, twice as many pawn brokers, and four times as 
many check cashers as predicted given their population.6 
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One reason these patterns matter so much is that subprime loans are more likely to lead to later 
foreclosures.  The lack of prime lending and the disproportionately high levels of subprime 
lending in diverse and majority non-white areas meant that they were hardest hit by the 
foreclosure crisis.  The chart below (for the region’s two central counties) shows how foreclosure 
rates soar when subprime lending rates reach 35-40 percent.  94% of the census tracts where 
35% or more of loans were subprime were also racially diverse or majority non-white.7 
The losses to households (and especially people of color) resulting from the housing crisis were 
enormous. A large national study of the impacts of the home losses and foreclosures estimated 
that $723 million of household wealth was lost in the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul in 
2012 alone, with another $581 million of potential losses from projected future foreclosures.  For 
Table 1: Subprime Lending in Minneapolis-St. Paul Neighborhoods, 2004 to 2006
Total  White  Minority
% % %
Loans Subprime Loans Subprime Loans Subprime
Minneapolis - Calhoun-Isle 3,078 8 2,443 7 211 19
Minneapolis - Camden 4,807 40 2,397 29 1,752 55
Minneapolis - Central 2,772 9 2,143 7 276 23
Minneapolis - Longfellow 2,945 17 2,121 13 375 36
Minneapolis - Near North 3,731 53 1,125 42 2,033 59
Minneapolis - Nokomis 5,864 17 4,215 14 801 39
Minneapolis - Northeast 3,952 22 2,830 19 576 40
Minneapolis - Phillips 986 38 393 22 462 50
Minneapolis - Powderhorn 4,917 28 2,811 19 1,441 44
Minneapolis - Southwest 5,599 10 4,307 8 435 26
Minneapolis - University 1,153 10 838 10 113 15
St. Paul - Battle Creek-Dayton's Bluff 4,059 32 2,201 25 1,353 42
St. Paul - Como / Midway / St. Anthony 3,045 14 2,346 11 317 31
St. Paul - Greater Eastside 2,723 33 1,551 28 826 38
St. Paul - Highland-South Mac Grove 2,857 9 2,302 8 155 21
St. Paul - Merriam Pk-N. Mac Grove-River 2,279 11 1,749 10 181 31
St. Paul - North End / Thomas-Dale 3,454 37 1,696 30 1,287 47
St. Paul - Payne-Phalen 3,045 37 1,514 29 1,137 48
St. Paul - Summit-University / Hill 2,021 22 1,240 13 466 43
St. Paul - West End-7th-Downtown 3,657 23 2,592 19 589 40
Minneapolis 39,804 23 25,623 15 8,475 46
Saint Paul 27,140 25 17,191 19 6,311 42
Suburbs 326,378 17 253,683 15 30,340 30
Total 393,322 18 296,497 15 45,126 35
Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
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majority non-white city neighborhoods this translated into a loss of $3,800 per household, more 
than 2.5 times the per-household loss in segregated white city neighborhoods (estimated at 
$1,500 per household).8  Between 2008 and 2012, the estimated loss from foreclosures and 
declining property values in the entire Twin Cities metropolitan was a staggering $20.5 billion.9 
 
 
 
The continuing pattern of shortfalls of prime mortgage lending to communities of color 
The housing finance market continues to underserve communities of color in the region. After 
concentrating toxic subprime loans in diverse and majority non-white neighborhoods, leading to 
disproportionate losses of equity and wealth for people of color, financial institutions continue to 
fail to provide a fair share of mortgage loans for communities of color – loans that today are 
almost exclusively for prime mortgages.   
There are a variety of ways a bank might underserve an area or a group.  For instance, problems 
can show up at a very early stage of the loan process.  A bank might underserve an area (or type 
of area) by simply not pursuing business there, leading to application and loan rates per 
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household below what occurs elsewhere, in more “desirable” neighborhoods.  Similarly, an area 
might receive fewer loans than expected given the mix of incomes in the neighborhood. 
Or problems might show up during the evaluation process, after an initial application is 
submitted.  For instance loan approval rates might be different in two neighborhoods for 
otherwise identical applicants, or they might be different for applicants of different races who are 
similar otherwise.   
Recent data show both types of problems in the Twin Cities.  Mortgage lending rate disparities 
are still significant across neighborhoods with different racial compositions.  Between 2009 and 
2012, racially diverse neighborhoods received only 93% of the home purchase loans and just 
67% of the refinance loans that would be expected given their share of regional homeowners.  
Majority non-white neighborhoods fared even worse receiving only 60% of expected home 
purchase loans and 38% of expected refinance loans. If diverse and majority non-white 
neighborhoods had received their fair share of loans by this measure, there would have been 
1,468 more home purchase loans in these neighborhoods (an increase of 24%) and 14,408 more 
refinance loans (an increase of 79%).10  
Controlling for income does not eliminate the disparities.  They remain nearly as great if the 
number of expected loans in a neighborhood is based on its income mix (in addition to the 
number of homeowners).  This calculation estimates how the actual number of loans in 2009-
2012 would have been distributed across neighborhoods if homeowners with the same incomes 
were as likely to receive a loan, regardless of where they lived.  If diverse and majority non-
white neighborhoods had received their expected number of loans by this measure, there would 
have been 1,412 more home purchase loans in these areas (an increase over the actual number of 
23%) and 11,972 more refinance loans (66% more than the actual number).11 The large shortfall 
of refinance loans in diverse and majority non-white neighborhoods could have greatly aided 
homeowners trying to renegotiate from more costly subprime loans into fair and sustainable 
home mortgages. 
Another way areas can be underserved occurs during the application process itself, when people 
of different races or neighborhoods with different racial mixes are treated differently. The recent 
data also show that non-origination rates (or the percentage of applicants who did not receive a 
loan for any reason) are highest in census tracts with the highest non-white population 
percentages – see the maps below.  For the most part, these were also the neighborhoods with the 
highest subprime rates in the past.   
Potential applicants of all types are affected by these disparities.  Overall, loan denial rates for 
home purchases were twice as high in predominantly non-white areas than in predominantly 
white ones between 2009 and 2012. Even middle and high income households were much more 
likely to be denied loans in predominantly nonwhite areas. Denial rates were one and a half times 
higher for middle/high income white households and twice as high for middle/high  
Map 3: Map 4:
Data Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, SF1.
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income people of color in predominantly nonwhite neighborhoods. The numbers for refinance 
loans were similar.12 
Region wide, different races are still treated very differently.  The non-origination rate for black 
applicants from 2009 to 2012 was 50%, followed by 45% for Hispanics, 37% for Asians, and 
only 29% for whites.  Income differences do not explain the disparities.  Whites had lower non-
origination rates than people of color with similar incomes at all income levels.  Of all the racial 
groups, black households showed particularly high disparities for home purchase loans – very 
high income black applicants were less likely to receive a purchase loan than very low income 
white applicants. Similarly, middle income black applicants were roughly twice as likely as 
middle income white applicants to be denied refinance loans.13 
The Near North area in Minneapolis has the worst lending patterns in the region when it comes 
to an applicant obtaining a home loan in today’s market.  More than half of mortgage 
applications do not result in a loan in Near North (55.1%) between 2009 and 2012. (See table 
next page.)  Non-origination rates in the Near North were lower for whites (46.3%) than 
minorities (65.1%), but the white non-origination rate was still much higher than in the metro 
overall (29.1%).  Even high to very high income whites had excessive non-origination rates in 
Near North (55.4%)—more than twice that of their group rate in the metro overall. Nor does the 
income of the neighborhood account for these disparities.  If loans were distributed across 
neighborhoods according to the income distribution of homeowners there would have been an 
additional 76 home purchase and 586 refinance loans made in Near North from 2009 to 2012.  
There were similarly disproportionate rates of lending in the Camden—in fact the area has the 
greatest predicted shortfall of any neighborhood in the Twin Cities.  In Camden there were 232 
fewer home purchase loans and 1,106 fewer refinances than expected given the actual income 
distribution of homeowners in the neighborhood.  The combined loss of 1,693 refinance loans to 
the Northside of Minneapolis is deeply troubling considering the abundant number of 
homeowners in the area that have attempted to renegotiate the terms of unsustainable home loans 
prompted by subprime and predatory lending practices. 
The impact of region’s largest lenders 
Although most mortgage lenders of every size in the Twin Cities have a poor track record of 
lending to communities of color, disparities with the largest lenders have, by far, the greatest 
impact region-wide.  For instance, if Wells Fargo Bank (the region’s largest lender) had 
distributed its loans exactly proportional to the distribution of homeowners of various incomes 
across the region between 2009 and 2012, the bank would have made an additional 1,518 
mortgage (purchase plus refinance) loans to racially diverse areas and an additional 2,729 loans 
to majority non-white areas.  This represents just over a fourth of the total shortfall in these 
neighborhoods (calculated above). The institution with the second largest shortfalls, U.S. Bank  
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NA, had a smaller but still significant effect – it would have made 459 more purchase loans and 
752 more refinance loans to these areas if they had been proportionally distributed.14 
Wells Fargo has been one a few major lenders involved in targeting subprime loans to 
communities of color in the region.  Between 2004 and 2006, there were two major subsidiaries 
of Wells Fargo that made refinance loans, Wells Fargo Bank NA, which focused primarily on 
making prime loans and Wells Fargo Financial Minnesota, which was primarily involved in 
making subprime loans.  During this period the percentage of loans from Wells Fargo’s 
subprime-lending subsidiary (Wells Fargo Financial Minnesota) going to nonwhite applicants 
was 1.6 times greater than the percentage going to nonwhite lenders from the bank’s prime-
lending subsidiary (Wells Fargo Bank NA).15  The region’s largest bank is thus a prime example 
of a lender that facilitated the concentration of subprime loans in diverse and majority-minority 
neighborhoods and that now provides prime loans at disproportionately low rates in those areas.  
The irony of course is that high subprime lending rates in those areas in the past contributed 
greatly to subsequent high foreclosure rates which, in turn, created the economic woes now used 
to justify disproportionately low lending rates in those neighborhoods. 
Two other major subprime lenders during the earlier time period were held by currently existing 
parent companies, Bank of America and HSBC Holdings. In 2008 Bank of America purchased 
the failing Countywide Financial Corporation.  After Wells Fargo, Countrywide was the largest 
lender between 2004 and 2006 and 18.4% of its loans made were subprime (34% higher than the 
regional average) and 28 percent of those were made to people of color (44% higher than the 
regional average).  Between 2009-2012 Bank of America NA made 40 fewer loans to diverse 
areas and 158 fewer loans to majority non-white areas than expected, given their homeowner 
shares and income mixes. 
Another major player in the subprime market, Decision One Mortgage (a subsidiary of HSBC 
Holdings Corporation) made 3,826 refinance loans between 2004 and 2006 – 92% of these loans 
were subprime and 27% were to minority borrowers. More recently, HSBC Holdings has largely 
withdrawn from the market and its subsidiaries received 392 refinance applications between 
2009 and 2012 and only 18 were originated by HSBC (with only 2 originated to people of 
color).16 
The major banks in the Twin Cities are also underserving the Northside of Minneapolis, the area 
that had the highest subprime lending rates and which currently has the lowest origination rates 
in the region.  Wells Fargo made 73 fewer home purchases and 576 fewer refinances in the 
Northside (Near North and Camden combined) than expected given neighborhood incomes—
nearly a third of the overall shortfall for the Northside.  Other leading banks also made fewer 
home loans than expected in North Minneapolis, especially fewer refinance loans.  U.S. Bank 
N/A made 183 fewer refinance loans than expected, followed by Bank of America, TCF (-44 and 
-20 respectively). 
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